Kód: 04534405

Changes of Mind

Name: Changes of Mind
Brand: Oxford University Press
SKU: 04534405
Price: 5170.00 CZK
Availability: BackOrder

Autor Neil Tennant

Jazyk: Angličtina
Vazba: Pevná
Počet stran: 364
Nakladatelství: Oxford University Press, 2012
Více informací o knize

5170 Kč

Dostupnost:

50 % šance

Máme informaci, že by titul mohl být dostupný. Na základě vaší objednávky se ho pokusíme do 6 týdnů zajistit.
Prohledáme celý svět

Informovat o naskladnění

Přidat mezi přání

Mohlo by se vám také líbit

Introducing Philosophy
1701 Kč
Koupit
On Ugliness
916 Kč
Předobjednat
Agrarian History of England and Wales: Volume 1, Prehistory to AD 1042
3812 Kč
Koupit
Expect Us
5443 Kč
Koupit
Resurrection of the Body in Western Christianity, 200-1336
3879 Kč
Koupit
Koncept kontinua
166 Kč
Koupit
Skloňování v češtině
25 Kč
Koupit

Dárkový poukaz: Radost zaručena

Darujte poukaz v libovolné hodnotě a my se postaráme o zbytek.
Poukaz se vztahuje na celou naši nabídku.
Elektronický poukaz vytisknete z e-mailu a můžete ihned darovat.
Platnost poukazu je 12 měsíců od data vystavení.

Objednat dárkový poukaz Více informací

Informovat o naskladnění knihy

Zašleme vám zprávu jakmile knihu naskladníme

Zadejte do formuláře e-mailovou adresu a jakmile knihu naskladníme, zašleme vám o tom zprávu. Pohlídáme vše za vás.

Nákupem získáte 517 bodů

Anotace knihy

This is the first logically precise, computationally implementable, book-length account of rational belief revision. It explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief - a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent's old beliefs. Belief systems are modeled as finite dependency networks. So one can attend not only to what the agent believes, but also to the variety of reasons the agent has for so believing. The computational complexity of the revision problem is characterized. Algorithms for belief revision are formulated, and implemented in Prolog. The implementation tests well on a range of simple belief-revision problems that pose a variety of challenges for any account of belief revision. The notion of 'minimal mutilation' of a belief system is explicated precisely for situations when the agent is faced with conflicting beliefs. The proposed revision methods are invariant across different global justificatory structures (foundationalist, coherentist, etc.). They respect the intuition that, when revising one's beliefs, one should not hold on to any belief that has lost all its former justifications. The limitation to finite dependency networks is shown not to compromise theoretical generality. This account affords a novel way to argue that there is an inviolable core of logical principles. These principles, which form the system of Core Logic, cannot be given up, on pain of not being able to carry out the reasoning involved in rationally revising beliefs. The book ends by comparing and contrasting the new account with some major representatives of earlier alternative approaches, from the fields of formal epistemology, artificial intelligence and mathematical logic.