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Více informací o knize Pragmatic Idealism and Scientific Prediction

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Anotace knihy

This monograph analyzes Nicholas Rescher's system of pragmatic idealism. It also looks at his approach to prediction in science. Coverage highlights a prominent contribution to a central topic in the philosophy and methodology of science. The author offers a full characterization of Rescher's system of philosophy. She presents readers with a comprehensive philosophico-methodological analysis of this important work. Her research takes into account different thematic realms: semantic, logical, epistemological, methodological, ontological, axiological, and ethical. The book features three, thematic-parts: I) General Coordinates, Semantic Features and Logical Components of Scientific Prediction; II) Predictive Knowledge and Predictive Processes in Rescher's Methodological Pragmatism; and III) From Reality to Values: Ontological Features, Axiological Elements, and Ethical Aspects of Scientific Prediction. This insightful analysis offers a critical reconstruction of Rescher's philosophy. The system he created is often characterized as pragmatic idealism that is open to some realist elements. He is a prominent representative of contemporary pragmatism who has made a great deal of contributions to the study of this topic. This area is crucial for science and it has been little considered in the philosophy of science.

Parametry knihy

Zařazení knihy Knihy v angličtině Humanities Philosophy History of Western philosophy

• Plný název: Pragmatic Idealism and Scientific Prediction
• Podnázev: A Philosophical System and Its Approach to Prediction in Science
• Autor: Amanda Guillán
• Jazyk: Angličtina
• Vazba: Pevná
• Počet stran: 336
• EAN: 9783319630427
• ISBN: 3319630423
• ID: 16499317
• Nakladatelství: Springer International Publishing AG
• Hmotnost: 6447 g
• Rozměry: 235 × 155 × 25 mm
• Datum vydání: 08. September 2017

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