Kód: 04763326
The global arms control community was severely shaken in the early 1990s by the belated discovery that two signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsIraq and North Koreapossessed advanced clandestine nuc ... celý popis
Zadejte do formuláře e-mailovou adresu a jakmile knihu naskladníme, zašleme vám o tom zprávu. Pohlídáme vše za vás.
The global arms control community was severely shaken in the early 1990s by the belated discovery that two signatories to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear WeaponsIraq and North Koreapossessed advanced clandestine nuclear weapons programs. In response to these challenges and to enhance its inspections capability, the International Atomic Energy Agency adopted a strengthened safeguards regime known as Program 93+2. Currently, the Islamic Republic of Iran provides a good test case for evaluating the implementation of this new verification system. Although Western intelligence agencies maintain that Iran does, in fact, possess a nuclear weapons program, verification measures open to the IAEA have traditionally remained limited. This detailed record of Irans relations with the IAEA explores the possibility that Program 93+2 may not allow detection of Iranian nuclear weapons development, provoking a larger issue for U.S. policy, namely, whether the international community has developed a system adequate to detect rogue nuclear weapons programs built through deception and denial.
Zařazení knihy Knihy v angličtině Society & social sciences Politics & government International relations
Osobní odběr Praha, Brno a 12903 dalších
Copyright ©2008-24 nejlevnejsi-knihy.cz Všechna práva vyhrazenaSoukromíCookies
Nákupní košík ( prázdný )